1. 1.“A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value,” Philosophical Studies 127, no. 1 (January 2006): 109-166. [published version] [PDF]

  2. 2.“Constructivism about Reasons,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 3, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008), pp. 207-245. [published version] [PDF]

  3. 3.“Reply to Copp: Naturalism, Normativity, and the Varieties of Realism Worth Worrying About,” Philosophical Issues (a supplement to Noûs), vol. 18 on “Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy,” ed. Water Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008, pp. 207-228. [published version] [PDF]

  4. 4.“In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference: Ideally Coherent Eccentrics and the Contingency of What Matters,” Philosophical Issues (a supplement to Noûs), vol. 19 on “Metaethics,” ed. Ernest Sosa, 2009, pp. 273-398. [published version] [PDF]

  5. 5.“What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?”, Philosophy Compass 5: (2010): 363-384. [published version] [PDF]

  6. 6.“Mind-Independence Without the Mystery: Why Quasi-Realists Can’t Have It Both Ways,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 6, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011), pp. 1-32. [published version] [PDF]

  7. 7.“Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy vol. 35, supplemental volume on Belief and Agency, ed. David Hunter, 2011, pp. 213-248. [published version] [PDF]

  8. 8.“Coming to Terms with Contingency: Humean Constructivism about Practical Reason.” In Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, eds. James Lenman and Yonatan Shemmer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 40-59. [published version] [PDF]

  9. 9.“Does Anything Really Matter or Did We Just Evolve to Think So?” Forthcoming in The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, eds. Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen, Gideon Rosen, and Seana Shiffrin. [PDF]

  10. 10.“If Everything Happens for a Reason, Then We Don’t Know What Reasons Are: Why the Price of Theism is Normative Skepticism.” Forthcoming in Challenges to Religious and Moral Belief: Disagreement and Evolution, eds. Michael Bergman and Patrick Kain (Oxford: Oxford University Press). [PDF]

  11. 11.“Nothing ‘Really’ Matters, but That’s Not What Matters.” Forthcoming in Does Anything Really Matter: Parfit on Objectivity, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Oxford University Press). [PDF]

  12. 12.“Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Rethink It.” Unpublished paper. [PDF]

  13. 13.“How to be a Relativist About Normativity.” Unpublished paper. [PDF]

  14. 14.“Normativity and Water: The Analogy and Its Limits.” Unpublished talk. [PDF]